K. VOROSHILOV

A COMMANDER OF GENIUS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE

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On the 21st of December 1949 the Soviet people and all progressive mankind celebrate the seventieth birthday of the greatest man on our planet Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin—their wise leader, teacher, indefatigable fighter for peace and for the independence of nations, the builder of a new human society and a commander of genius.

In these days throughout the world hundreds of millions of people, physical and mental workers, of every race and nationality turn their eyes with hope and brotherly trust towards the Soviet Union, to the Land of Socialism victorious, to the wise and great friend of all the oppressed—to Stalin. They know that the Soviet Union led by the great Stalin, is a powerful fighter for peace and for Socialism, against reaction and the organizers of a new world war, a stronghold of the supporters of people's democracy in their struggle against the demented dictatorship of Anglo-American imperialism.

Through years of heroic struggle and labour the Soviet people led by the Bolshevik Party, under the great leadership of Lenin and Stalin has won victories which have made world history. Having crushed the power of the capitalists and landlords, and destroyed forever the exploitation of man by man, having successfully defended their Socialist Motherland and its state and political independence in the battle against internal and foreign enemies, our people has created immense material and spiritual values, has built Socialism and is effecting a success-

ful transition to a communist society. Proudly conscious of the victories they have won, on the day they celebrate the seventieth anniversary of its leader and genius, great Stalin, the Soviet people can state: there have not been and there cannot be such obstacles and difficulties which would be insuperable for Soviet men and women, led forward on the road of victory by the great Stalin to the heights of human happiness—to Communism.

In these significant days the whole of progressive mankind beyond the frontiers of our Motherland, sends with feelings of deep gratefulness and love words of gratitude to the great leader and military commander of genius Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, Stalin, who, at the head of the Soviet people and its glorious and victorious army, has ensured hundreds of millions of people freedom, independence, the conditions for socialist transformation, and has rid all humanity of fascist slavery.

1

On the 22nd of June 1941 the German fascist army, treacherously breaking the pact of non-aggression, overran the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.

One hundred and seventy well-trained and technically equipped German divisions concentrated on our frontiers and supported by the huge resources and rich industrial base of Europe which the fascists had captured, also the intoxication following from their easy victories in the West—all this contributed to the illusory calculations of the fascist high command counting on finishing the war against the Soviet Union victoriously with "lightning" speed.

On the 30th of June 1941, the State Committee of Defence with Comrade Stalin at its head was formed. At

the end of the first month of the war—on the 19th of July 1941, when the enemy in a mad onslaught was driving deep into our Motherland, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. appointed Comrade Stalin People's Commissar of Defence of the Union of the S.S.R. and in August 1941 by the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) Stalin took the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.

By the will of the Party and the Government, expressing the desires of the whole Soviet people, at the gravest moment for our Socialist State when a real danger to the life of our Motherland was threatening, Stalin became the leader of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

In the course of the whole history of the Soviet State, the name of Stalin in the minds of Soviet men and women has always been associated with the idea of victory—no matter whether in the sphere of socialist construction or of war against the enemies of the Soviet people. The appointment of Stalin to the most responsible posts, therefore, was received by the Soviet public with relief and hope and filled the Soviet people with steadfast faith in victory even in this most arduous ordeal of history.

The Soviet people were not mistaken. At the end of the fourth year of the Great Patriotic War the multimillion hitlerite army, well-drilled, equipped with modern military technique, spoiled by the easy victories in Europe, led by experienced military specialists, the army which had seemed invincible to many in the Old and the New World—suffered catastrophic defeat in single combat with the Soviet Army led by the brilliant communist commander Stalin.

Here we have not the opportunity to give a somewhat

exhaustive analysis of the treasure house of Stalin's strategical plans and of those brilliant operations which were organized and carried out by our heroic Armed Forces under the leadership of its Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

But it is necessary if only superficially to touch on the basic stages of this great military epic.

When studying and examining the Great Patriotic War in relation to the character and results of the most decisive operations, the course of military events may be broken up into approximately four periods, each of which reflects the originality and constant progress of the development of Stalinite military art.

The first period includes the operations from June 1941, until about autumn 1942, that is until our counter-offensive at Stalingrad. The Soviet Supreme Command, by active defence combined with counterattacks and counter-offensive in the most important strategic directions, broke during this period the striking force of the fascist army and buried the German strategy of "lightning" war. The genius of Stalin's leadership and the unexampled valour of our troops during that period turned the balance of strength in our favour and thus created, in spite of the absence of a second front, favourable conditions for our troops to go over to a decisive offensive. Leningrad, Moscow, Tikhvin, Rostov, were the historic fields on which crushing blows were delivered against the German military forces. In this period the myth about the invincibility of the German army was exploded. The tireless, truly heroic labour of the Soviet people in all spheres of the national economy to meet the needs of the front, the valour of Soviet warriors at the front, the glorious battle actions of Soviet partisans in the rear of the enemy, never seen before on such a scale, the tense effort of the country in its entirety in the name of victory have no equal in the history of nations.

The second period, from about the end of 1942, that is, from the battle of Stalingrad, to the end of 1943, is the period of the radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Army in brilliant and numerous battles finally wrested from the enemy the strategic initiative, consolidated its superiority over the enemy forces, went over to a resolute offensive on a huge front and liberated two-thirds of occupied Soviet territory. Suffering huge losses the armed forces of fascist Germany were compelled to go over to the defence on all fronts.

The encirclement and capture of two German fascist armies in the Battle of Stalingrad which for the Germans turned into an unprecedented slaughter, after which the hitlerite army could not recover until the end of the war, the destruction of the German's southern front, the breaking of the siege of Leningrad, the rout of the German formations in the Kursk battle—Hitler's last attempt to turn the tide of the war in his favour, the liberation of left-bank Ukraine and the battle for the Dnieper—those were the most glorious and historic events on the road of the victorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union during this period.

The third period, including the operations of 1944 is the period of the decisive victories of the Soviet Army, known as the period of Stalin's ten blows. At this stage the sweep and overwhelming nature of the offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces reached their culminating point. As a result of these operations the Balkan allies of Germany were put out of action—monarchical Rumania and tsarist Bulgaria and after that pro-fascist Finland and Hungary under Horthy, and every one of the fascist aggressors were driven beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Land while all military operations were transferred to the territory of the enemy.

The defeat of the Germans at Leningrad and of the Finns in Karelia and in the Far North, the liberation of the Crimea and right-bank Ukraine, the destruction of the central German front in Byelorussia, the liberation of Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics, the occupation of Rumania and Bulgaria and the deep penetration into Hungary—all these operations were carried out in the style of classical Stalinite offensive strategy on a gigantic scale. In these operations the Soviet Army, making use of Stalin's skilled operational manoeuvring succeeded brilliantly in breaking through the enemy's front simultaneously at several points, thus depriving him of the possibility of gathering reserves for the parrying of our powerful, sudden blows. The most perfect form of manoeuvre for the surrounding and liquidating of the chief formations of the enemy formed during this period the basis for the battle operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The fourth and last period—from the end of 1944 up to the end of the second world war—may be described as the period of final victories of the Soviet Union over hitlerite Germany. Enriched by three years of experience in battle, having mastered to perfection all the complex forms of operational manoeuvre and tactical stratagems of total battle involving huge and skilful massing of battle technique in the required directions, the Soviet Army rapidly overcame during this period all the long-prepared fortifications in East Prussia and in the central direction —from the Vistula to Berlin. These fortifications no less formidable in strength than the famous "Siegfried Line" considered by the hitlerite commanders to be an impregnable wall, were unable, however, not only to stop but even to check the swift offensive of the Soviet troops.

The most glorious victories of this period: the destruction of the southern wing of the German front and the occupation of Budapest and Vienna, the defeat

of the Germans in East Prussia, the crushing of the enemy's central formations in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, in Czechoslovakia, in Silesia and Pomerania and as the final blow—the complete destruction and capitulation of the Nazi-German army and the capture of Berlin by our troops.

As a result of four years of war the Soviet people and their victorious army thanks to Stalin's strategic genius and generalship, gained complete victory over hitlerite Germany.

The "prophecies" of the enemy camp and of one or two of the "allies" on the British Isles and across the ocean who from the first months of the war had been waiting impatiently for the defeat of the Soviet Army did not come true.

The hidden and open sabotage against the creation of a second front in the West and the strategy of minor operations of the Anglo-American command brought it about that the whole might of the German army was concentrated against the Soviet Union. By their unworthy game of provocation the Anglo-American "allies," who desired the greatest possible exhaustion and weakening of the Soviet Union, and consequently the prolongation of the war, gave Hitler the opportunity of waging the war for three years solely on the Soviet front without a glance behind him and having no fear for his rear, having concentrated against the Soviet Union huge masses of troops and equipment.

And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were unavoidably fatal and that the Soviet Union singlehanded and independently would put an end to Nazi Germany and her satellites, were Messrs. Churchills and Marshalls compelled to hurry the opening of the second front delayed ... for two years.

2

Throughout the second world war the military thought of the fascist generals at the base of which lay a reactionary, metaphysical world outlook—added nothing new and could add nothing new to the general principles of the warfare of bourgeois states. The most that the fascist military clique showed itself capable of was to turn once again to the adventuristic idea of "blitzkrieg" already proved bankrupt in the first world war, a conception which reflected the organic inability of the German militarists to attain to the level of a scientific understanding of modern war.

The results of the war of hitlerite Germany against the U.S.S.R. showed the utter absurdity of counting on victory by "blitzkrieg" methods. That which for hitlerism was effective and real when it concerned the capitalist countries of Western Europe, became illusory and disastrous in war against the Soviet Union.

Only in the U.S.S.R. in conditions of a socialist system, in conditions of the predominance of Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialist practice, is real military science possible.

Soviet military science was born and perfected simultaneously with the beginning and development of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Land. Military science is rightly called by us Stalinite military science. From the first days of the creation of the Soviet Armed Forces Stalin gave much attention and spent no small labour on the scientific elaboration and theoretic foundations of the principles of Soviet military science.

Stalinite military science, basing itself on a correct understanding of the laws of social development was born with the coming to power of the working class, developed and strengthened itself on the foundation of the

Soviet state system. Such decisive elements as a new socialist system of social structure with a planned economy, new productive forces and new relations of production among people possessing a new ideology and new moral standard form the base on which rests the whole edifice of Stalinite military science.

Being a harmonious system of really scientific knowledge of the whole complex body of questions of modern war, Stalinite military science apart from purely military elements—strategy, operational skill, tactics, the organization and training of troops—embraces the sum total of social-political, economic and moral factors in their interaction and determining influence on warfare as a whole.

Soviet military art as a component part of a military science that had assimilated the experience of past wars and had adapted it to the socialist nature of the state, has armed our commanding cadres with theoretical and practical knowledge in the field of strategy, operational skill, tactics, the organization and training of troops and has thus allowed them to understand correctly the character of war, to comprehend the nature of modern operations and battle and also the role of various types of troops, their importance and practical use.

In this connection it is especially necessary to emphasize the Stalinite treatment of the question of constantly acting factors, among which the importance of the economic and moral potential of the country is given one of the decisive places in the organization and attainment of victory in modern war.

Stalin has divided these factors strictly into two groups: temporary, fortuitous, and constantly acting factors—and has designated the appropriate place, role and importance of each, as well as their mutual connection.

Of all the temporary, fortuitous factors on which the

strategic calculations of the German command in planning war against the Soviet Union were based—Stalin singles out "the element of surprise" as the most effective military factor.

To the second group of factors determining the course and outcome of a war Stalin refers: the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the equipment of the army and the organizational ability of the commanding personnel of the army.

The deep scientific analysis of these factors given by Stalin has immense not only theoretical but—in conditions of the fiercest warfare—also practical significance. Soviet people have received the key to understanding the perspective of war and the inevitability of the victory of the Soviet Union. It is not by chance that in his speeches Stalin touches many times either on all these factors in their entirety or on one of them in accordance with the circumstances in which events took place.

Stalin's thesis about the advantages and significance of the enduring constantly acting factors and the limitations of the temporary fortuitous factors—implanted in the Soviet people and their army a firm conviction in our superiority over the enemy, confirmed the unshakeable faith in victory, mobilized for heroic deeds at the front, and for great feats of labour in the rear. Faith in our own strength, steadfast certainty of victory were a powerful factor and the natural prerequisite of victory.

In the idea of the stability of the rear is included all that constitutes the life and activity of the whole state—social system, politics, economy, the apparatus of production, the degree of organization of the working people, the ideology, science, art, moral condition of the people and other things.

The scale of modern military operations, the vast num-

ber of the people taking part in them and the huge quantity of technical battle equipment employed, place on the rear (i.e., the whole country) extremely high demands on the timely fulfilment of which depends the outcome of the battle actions of the troops and, in the final account, the outcome of the war as a whole.

The genius of Stalin in foreseeing even at the beginning of the war the inevitable defeat of the hitlerite army was founded on knowledge of the relative political-economic and social weakness of hitlerite Germany, that is, the instability of its rear, and on the certitude of the stability of the Soviet rear, that is, of our whole state.

Enumerating the miscalculations of the German high command in the strategic planning of the war, Stalin gives first place to their miscalculations regarding the condition of their own rear and that of their opponent.

"... The enemy sadly miscalculated," says Stalin. "He failed to take into account the strength of the Red Army, failed to take into account the stability of the Soviet rear, failed to take into account the determination of the peoples of our country to achieve victory, failed to take into account the unreliability of the European rear of fascist Germany, and, lastly, he failed to take into account the inherent weakness of fascist Germany and her army."

To questions of the organization and work of the Soviet rear Stalin returned in his speeches and orders of the day many times and at all stages of the war, emphasizing the exceptional and decisive importance of the rear in the work of carrying out military operations and ensuring the destruction of the enemy.

"The fact that the Red Army was able successfully to perform its duty to our country and has expelled the Germans from the boundaries of our Soviet territory is due to the devoted support it received from the rear, from our entire country, from all the peoples of our country."

The next of the constantly acting factors is the morale of the army.

This factor is connected organically with the moral-political condition of the rear which feeds the army not only with all kinds of equipment—with ammunition, technique, armaments, food, men, but also with ideas, ideology, moods and morale.

In all the wars of the past the moral steadfastness of fighting armies always played a role of primary importance. And in modern wars when not only the army fights but the whole country, the whole people, when armies many million strong on both sides take part in battle operations, when extremely long and tense battles are fought—the moral steadfastness, the endurance, the heroism of the troops engaged acquires exclusive significance. That is why Stalin singles out this factor particularly as one of the decisive factors of the Great Patriotic War.

All the commanders and theoreticians of military affairs in the past also assigned great importance to the moral factor. But they regarded it as an isolated element, unrelated to the character of war, to the social-political, economic and moral-ideological principles of the warring states, dissociated from the masses of the people—the main source of strength, deciding, in the final account, victory over the enemy.

Much has been written by bourgeois military writers about the moral factor of troops and its importance but their interpretation of the question of the moral qualities of an army has nothing in common with the treatment of this question by Stalin. Stalin makes the moral factor, the spirit of the army dependent primarily on the nature of the political aims of the war and consequently on the nature of the social system, the nature of domestic and foreign policy of the given state, on the level of conscious-

ness and culture of the broad masses of the people, on the predominant ideology, etc.

The morale of the army, as Stalin teaches, depends in the first place and above all on the nature of the political aims of the war, that is, what the state is fighting for, on the degree of consciousness of the men and commanders of the army, on the depth of their understanding of the justness of the war which is taking place and the necessity of waging it to save their own country from the attacker, the aggressive enemy, on the depth of love for their Motherland and of their faith in the righteousness of their cause, of their faith in victory, of their faith in the leaders of the country and of the active armed forces.

"...The morale of our Army is higher than that of the German, for it is defending its native land against alien invaders and believes in the justice of its cause, whereas the German army is waging a war of annexation, is plundering a foreign country, and is unable to believe even for one moment in the justice of its vile cause." (J. Stalin.)

The noble and lofty aims of the war—and such were the aims of the Patriotic War of the Soviet people and its army defending their Socialist Motherland from the aggression of bestial fascism—in these lies the guarantee of the unshakeable morale of a patriotic people and its army.

The other constantly acting factors—the quantity and quality of divisions, the equipment of the army, the organizational abilities of the commanding personnel, by which the framework of the strategic planning of the war and its execution is conditioned, are obvious and irrefutable, the more so in that they are, at bottom, determined by that same economic and moral-political might of the country.

The other side of the same question of long-term constantly acting factors is that in the course of the war it was necessary to ensure that the balance of these factors was in our favour since constantly acting factors are not a definite, immutable quantity. This favourable balance is created not by its own momentum, not mechanically but by the intense labour of the people and by correct leadership. The building up of this balance of all the decisive, enduring and constantly acting factors which ensured, in the final account, victory to Soviet arms was one of the greatest merits of the Party of Lenin and Stalin and of the leader of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

In line with the thesis concerning the constantly acting factors of victory, in the strategic planning of the war and its decisive campaigns and separate operations stands another, no less important thesis—concerning reserves.

Stalin has always paid very serious attention to the reserves. His evaluation of the role of reserves even during the Civil War and the war of intervention is well known.

That is why in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War alongside of the organization of active defence, the accumulation of strategic and operational reserves for the waging of a prolonged and victorious war occupied the lion's share of Stalin's attention.

It is known that at all stages of the war every operation by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief had to be ensured by the reserves necessary for its execution. In this lies one of the particularities of Stalinite strategical leadership of the battle actions of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The Commander-in-Chief solved brilliantly one of the most important problems—the problem of creating commanding cadres.

During the course of the war new Soviet military commanders, generals and cadres of officers grew up who proved in action their devotion to their Motherland, to the Bolshevik Party and who were able in huge battles to turn Stalin's strategic and operational-tactical plans into a living reality.

3

The Great Patriotic War with a front extending upon thousands of kilometres demanded of the Soviet military command the solution of a most complex problem—the problem of organizing the strategic synchronization of several fronts. The organization, the uninterrupted supplying and conduct of operations of a similar kind directed, according to a single plan, towards the attainment of a single strategic aim, is a matter of extreme complexity and difficulty. This problem could be coped with only by Stalin's military genius, and he supplied its complete solution.

The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1942-43 and particularly the liberation of left-bank Ukraine in 1943, after the victory of our army on the Kursk bulge, was carried out with amazing determination by the synchronized operations of many fronts, united in a thousand-kilometre theatre of military activity by a single strategic plan and the single commanding will of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, by the will of the great Stalin.

Even more amazing in their exceptionally extensive sweep and brilliant results from the point of view of synchronization of fronts were the offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1944-45, when on an enormous expanse of territory from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, Soviet troops with consecutive and simultane-

ous crushing blows definitely annihilated the armies of fascist Germany and her allies.

In all these brilliant Stalinite operations, both the synchronization of groups of fronts in one strategic direction and the synchronization of fronts operating in separate directions, but all of them coordinated by the unity of Stalin's strategic plan, found their full expression. The genius of Stalin inspired the commanders of fronts and armies, officers and men of the mighty Soviet Army to heroic feats in the name of their Socialist Motherland.

In the Great Patriotic War under the leadership of Stalin one of the most complex and difficult problems of the art of war—the manoeuvre for the encirclement and annihilation of great masses of enemy troops—was solved in a fully practical way. In the course of the last war the German fascist command sought many times but without success to carry out a strategic manoeuvre of this kind against Soviet troops. In the offensive operations of the Soviet Army this strategic encircling manoeuvre became the principal form of its battle action.

The demands of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin—"to cut the enemy's communications by skilful and daring manoeuvres, surround and break up his forces and destroy and capture his manpower and materiel"—fully materialized in a variety of forms of encirclement used by the Soviet Army in the various conditions and circumstances of battle, and thus the widespread theory of bourgeois military specialists concerning the exceptional rarity and fortuity of encircling operations was refuted in deed. That which was impossible for bourgeois armies, for the German fascist imitators of their military theory and practice, became possible and realizable for the Armed Forces of the Soviet State.

The outstanding operations of encirclement and complete destruction of the enemy—at Stalingrad, Korsun-

Shevchenkovsky, Minsk, Jassy-Kishinev, Berlin and many others—were a brilliant demonstration of the growth and maturity of Soviet soldiers, officers and generals of the Stalinite school, who in the course of the Great Patriotic War had been gradually mastering, and finally mastered to perfection, this most complex form of strategic and tactical operational manoeuvre, embodying it creatively in the most varied conditions of troop warfare.

After the historic battle at Kursk which buried forever the hitlerite offensive strategy, the fascist army suffered, right up till the Berlin capitulation, consecutive, crushing defeats to a greater or lesser degree similar to the debacle at Stalingrad.

From now on the historians of war and military art will not talk only of "Cannes" and "Sedan." The Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War transformed Stalin's strategic ideas into a reality and gave history remarkable examples of the execution and results of large encircling operations and the liquidation of the chief enemy groups. Many of these operations will be recorded as classical examples in the history of war.

It is known that in modern offensive operations in the overwhelming majority of cases where the lines of the enemy are deeply echeloned and powerfully defended, the decisive place belongs to the frontal blow as the radical method of breaking through these lines and developing the success in the depth of the enemy's defences.

The Soviet Supreme Command confronted during the war with the necessity of smashing the German fascist defences which had been brought to a high degree of perfection, found the strength, means and tactical-operational methods of solving this most difficult problem with enormous effect. Moreover, in numerous offensive operations to break through the defending front, the Soviet Supreme Command used with great creative variety the

frontal blow. Such a frontal blow, after destroying the defences of the enemy, was quickly developed with the aid of powerful mobile forces—tanks, self-propelled artillery, motorized infantry and cavalry in coordination with air forces—into other types of manoeuvre, and inevitably led to the encirclement and liquidation of the enemy's troops, or to the destruction and pursuit of the enemy to a depth of strategic importance.

A powerful frontal blow in one direction, a series of shattering blows in several others, breaking up the enemy's defence on a wide front, a blow splitting his front to a great depth—all these Stalinite forms of manoeuvre strictly coordinated in operational and operational-strategical synchronization, were widely used in the offensive operations of the Soviet Army. The battle operations of our troops assumed a particularly destructive character in 1943-45, when thanks to the heroic work of the Soviet people in the rear the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was able to create the necessary concentration of striking forces and ordnance (tanks, air forces, self-propelled and other artillery) in the chief directions of the breakthrough. Under these conditions the German fascist defensive front definitely collapsed throughout its tactical depth on the day of the operation or the day after. As a result of this the offensive, as a rule, developed at extraordinarily high speed.

There should be mentioned such a decisive form of battle as strategic counterattack. Making use of it in the first stage of the war under conditions of the enemy's overwhelming superiority in forces and equipment, the Soviet Armed Forces, having bled him dry in active defence, gained the operational and strategic initiative and created conditions for the subsequent counteroffensive operations on a gigantic scale along the entire Soviet-German front.

What has been said above by no means exhausts the whole wealth of strategic and operational-tactical problems so successfully solved in the Great Patriotic War under the supreme command of the great Stalin, by the excellent General Staff, by the corps of officers and the whole mighty, valorous, Soviet Army and Navy.

The huge sweep of consecutive and simultaneous operations along the front and in great depth, with their crushing character and speed; the skilled, tactical and operational synchronization of all types of troops, combined with flexible and daring manoeuvre in any kind of fighting conditions; active defence brought to perfection, capable of resisting blows of any strength and ensuring conditions for going over to a resolute counteroffensive; the effective use of massed armoured troops and aviation in the main directions of the offensive for the overwhelming of the whole operational-strategic depth of the enemy; artillery offensive as the most rational way of using all types of cannon, and a whole series of other important problems found their correct and fullest solution in the combat activity of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

The great, victorious Patriotic War will go down in history as a triumph of the Soviet socialist system, as a proof of the superiority of the armed forces of Socialism over the fascist armies, as the undeniable proof of the superiority of Soviet, Stalinite military science over the reactionary doctrine of German imperialism, as the triumph of the generalship, of the strategic and military genius of the great Stalin.

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The great and historic victory of the Land of Socialism over fascist Germany and imperialist Japan, the victory won by the Soviet people under the leadership of the

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